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Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract
The volatile yen/dollar exchange rate has largely influenced Japan’s business cycles and
foreign economic relations from the 1980s. In particular to note is the triangular pattern
of trade interdependence which appeared following the rising yen exchange rate and a
increased scale of Foreign Direct Investments from Japan. Along with the post-bubble
recession, however, the global position of the yen has also declined. The more
international use of the currency, although recommended by policy-makers and
economists, is limited because of the fact that Japanese economy stands on two pillars,
the United States and East Asia, and the latter is more dependent on the former than
on Japan.
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0. Introduction
 In contrast to the 1980s, when the possibility of the tri-polar system of the world
economy, composed of the United States, Europe and Japan, was widely discussed, the
international reputation of the Japanese economy has largely deteriorated in the 1990s,
along with the post-bubble recession. One example is the international position of
Japanese financial institutions. Contrary to their share of 31 % in 1988, Japanese
banks occupied only 13 % in the external banking business as of 19981. Another
example is the share of the yen in the world international reserves, which decreased
from the peak of 7.3% in 1990 to 4.8% in 1998 (Table 1).
 As a matter of fact, the recession itself, the severest one since the post-war period, was
closely connected with the foreign economic relations surrounding this country, and the
declining presence of Japan can be characterised as a side effect of a boom and bust
cycle from the mid-1980s through the 1990s. Due to the large swing of the cycle, the
current state of Japan, as well as the yen, is possibly undervalued. Indeed to what
extent of undervaluation is difficult to say, but important to know is the backgrounds
against which the global position of the currency is determined. The more international
use of the yen, although recommended by policy-makers and economists, is limited
because of circumstances in which Japanese economy is located. Knowing that will help
us to see the prospect of Japan in the coming century. We try to discuss in the following
way.
 Section 1 describes how the yen/dollar exchange rate affected the Japanese business
cycles and foreign economic relations from the 1980s onwards. In addition, a new
pattern of foreign trade and capital flows which appeared is discussed. Section 2 deals
with the question of how the international role of the yen has been determined, initially
from a viewpoint of the economic background. In short, Japan stands on the two pillars:
the United States, on the one hand, and East Asia, on the other, whereas East Asian
c o u n t r i e s  d e p e n d  m o r e  l a r g e l y  o n  t h e  U n i t e d  S a t e s  t h a n  o n  J a p a n .  T h i s  s i t u a t i o n
explains how Japan has formulated its foreign economic policies. Then, we review the
economic diplomacy in the 1990s, in particular during and after the Asian currency
crisis. Lastly in Section 3, the conclusion of this paper is summarised.
  
1.  Foreign Economic Relation of Japan
                                                  
1 Measured by external assets of banks located in each country, from BIS, International Banking and
Financial Market Developments, various issues.3
1.1 The unstable exchange rate and related policies
 From the early 1970s, Japan’s foreign economic policy-making has been almost
determined by the dollar/yen exchange rate, which caused also a large swing of the
business cycles2. The yen exchange rate showed an accelerated appreciation after the
Plaza Agreement (Figure 1). The international macroeconomic policy co-ordination was
designed for soft landing of the dollar, which, however, resulted in the “bubble economy”
and the long recession after its burst-out. One of the reasons of this serious side-effect
was the lack of prudential policy considerations, in the sense that the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) stuck to a balanced budget policy and thus shifted an undue burden
onto the monetary policy,
In order to soften the depressing effect of the yen appreciation, the Bank of Japan
(BOJ) pursued an easy money policy, keeping the official Bank Rate at the historically
low level, in particular at 2.5% from February 1987 to May 1989. With a hindsight, this
policy stance obliged by the international considerations stimulated speculation in the
stock exchange and the land market. Rising private consumption and investments
contributed to unusually high growth rates between 6 and 4% from 1988 to 1991. As the
macroeconomic policy turned to a tight stance, in particular, after the BOJ successively
raised the interest rate from 2.5 % to 4.75 %, and the new regulations on bank credit on
real estates were introduced, the bubble finally burst out. The GDP growth declined to
less than 1% from 1992.
From early 1990, the yen began to appreciate, with a record peak of 79.75 yen/dollar
in April 1995. Its volatility was also the largest in that year. From the summer of 1995,
however, the appreciation of the yen gave way to the depreciation, reaching the level of
140 yen in mid-1998. Although the Japanese growth rate picked up to around 3% in
1995 and 1996, another depression wave commenced in 1997. In consideration of the
recovering growth rates, Hashimoto government introduced a policy package of
structural reforms, and raised consumption tax from 3% to 5%, and patients’ payment of
medical care. These fiscal measures resulted in a larger shock than expected, namely
minus growth rates for consecutive years. Large financial institutions, security houses
and banks, went bankrupt from late 1997 to 1998, further deteriorating public
confidence in the government policy. As a result, the 1990s is characterized as “the lost
                                                  
2 The relationship between the exchange rate, business cycles in Japan, and the trade
frictions is smartly analyzed in McKinnon and Ohno (1997). However, we shall comment on
their views in the last section.4
decade,” which can be attributed to the “boom and bust” cycle from the mid-1980s, being
deteriorated further by the change in policy-stance in 1997. Noteworthy is the fact that
Hashimoto’s reforms, as those under the preceding governments, were partly a response
to economic frictions with United States.
 The yen depreciation got momentum from late 1996, as international investors began
to perceive that economic reforms to cut budget deficits and revitalize the economy
would not succeed in Japan, and the stock prices recorded an accelerated decline, led by
financial stocks. The BOJ has kept inter-bank rate at 0% from February 1999 in order
to stimulate economic recovery from the severest depression, and more importantly to
h e l p  b a n k s  r e d u c e  h u g e  a m o u n t  o f  b a d  l o a n s .  T h i s  p o l i c y  i s  a l s o  r e l a t e d  t o
considerations on international capital flows to the United States. Yen began to
appreciate again from the mid-1999, and this time also, rising yen led politicians to
demand for more expansionary money supply. We shall discuss this topic in the last
section.
1.2 Economic Frictions and Structural Adjustments3
The unstable yen/dollar exchange rate, accompanied by Japanese surplus in current
account, caused international economic conflicts. According to US policy-makers and
some of the economists, the under-valued yen sustained Japan’s growing trade surplus,
on the one hand, and US deficits, on the other hand. The word, structural adjustments
often appeared in the US-Japan trade talks, implying economic reforms that help to
reduce Japanese surplus. While decreased from 4.3% in 1986 to 1.5% in 1990, it
increased again until 1994 in terms of the US dollar. Its ratio to GDP gradually declined
from the peak of the 1990s, 3.1% in 1993 to 2.2% in 1995, and this tendency continued
through the 1990s.
  While the current account of the balance of payments is identical with the domestic
saving-investment gap, structural problems may cause such a gap, and accordingly lead
to international policy debates. Moreover, although the bilateral trade imbalance has
little sense, if any, from purely economics’ point of view, it has a large political impact, in
particular with the United States. How to open the Japanese market has been the focus
of trade negotiations with the United States, as well as with European Union and Asian
countries.
 Whereas economists have not yet agreed on an objective way to measure a degree of
protection, the issue was not the tariff level itself, because the tariffs on industrial
                                                  
3 Following discussions are based on Iwami (1998).5
products stayed lower in Japan than the United States and the EU. In addition,
Japanese non-tariff barriers against foreign manufactured products (apart from
agricultural imports) are said to remain lower than most of the industrial countries4.
Despite these facts, there is still a widespread belief that some “unfair” and/or
structural factors keep Japanese imports at an artificially low level. The US
government proposed Japan to discuss on structural impediments such as
governmental procurement, business practices, and distribution system5.
  Often criticized evidence of Japanese trade barrier is the low share of manufactured
goods in total imports. However, this ratio has been remarkably rising since the Plaza
Agreement, from ca. 30% in 1985 to 59 % in 1995, mainly led by increased imports from
East Asian countries that occupied around 40% of the total manufactured imports in
19946. As discussed below, the increased number of Japanese manufacturing
subsidiaries in that area contributed to this tendency.
Japan liberalized international capital transactions in the early 1980s, beginning
with the amended Foreign Exchange Law of 1980. Now, there are no legal regulations
on both inward and outward capital flows. Rather other forms of barriers than
restrictions on capital transactions cause the relatively low level of inward Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI). According to the opinions of foreign firms, the major hindrance
to invest was difficulties in employing staffs, high wage cost and land prices, as well as
the closed system symbolized by the word Keiretsu. Also criticized by foreign would-be
investors were various forms of administrative regulations such as limit on capital
participation in telecommunications and transport, regulations for the sake of food
safety, industrial standards peculiar in Japan. Most of these barriers have been more or
less relaxed and/or reformed, with a result of increased inward FDI flows particularly
after the worst stage of the financial turmoil had passed.
  Japan often made concessions on the bilateral basis with the United States, not
following the multilateral principles of the GATT. The 1991 US-Japan Semiconductor
Arrangements, following the similar one in 1986, expected that the US share of
semiconductor products would reach 20% in the Japanese market. This expectation was
realized in 1992. Such result-oriented approach on the part of the US appeared
repeatedly in talks on automobiles (and parts), and cellular telephone. Although Japan
reluctantly accepted some of these requests, they did not necessarily lead to cost-
                                                  
4 OECD (1991), p.67.
5 For this issue, see, for example, Sato (1991) and Sekiguchi (1993).
6 MITI (1996), pp.149, 151.6
reduction and more benefits to consumers, naturally with a disadvantage to damage the
principle of non-discriminative multilateralism.
  The SII (Structural Impediments Initiative) talks 1990-92 resulted in a report as
President Bush persuaded Japanese side to complete it in order to avoid designating
Japan as “a country of unfair trading practices” by the “Super 301” provisions added to
the 1974 Trade Act. This report recommended Japan to expand public investments for
living environments, to improve access of foreign products and investments, and to
strengthen the Fair Trade Commission for prohibiting discriminative practices. The
Framework for a New Economic Partnership 1994-95 determined that the mid-term
objective for Japan is to promote domestic demand and to provide easier access for
foreign competitors. Strongly stressed areas were financial services, government
procurement of telecommunications, automobiles including parts, and inward direct
investment.
  Whereas Japan also claimed US problems such as fiscal deficits, the US
recommendation on structural reforms stood in the similar line as the deregulation
policy stance of the Japanese government from the late 1980s. For example, rice import
was finally decided to be liberalized, foreign entries into the telecommunication, and air
transport industries became increased. Above all, reforms of the financial system were
undertaken, symbolized by the slogan of the “Big Bang” under the Hashimoto
government. Under the prolonged recession, pessimistic sentiments that Japan would
lose her competitiveness gained popularity. Deregulation and liberalization, as it was
stressed, are the last resort for steering the economy out of the recession. The
depression induced Japanese policy-makers and business leaders to the recognition that
most of the structural characteristics in Japan is rather a cause of the economic
weakness than strength, and accept foreign pressures to promote reforms.
1.3 A Triangular Pattern of Interdependence
  A new pattern of interdependence emerged in the 1980s as Japanese enterprises
accelerated FDI in the region in order to avoid the damaging effects of the yen
appreciation on their exports. Although the yen depreciated again thereafter, and it
would help to increase exports from Japan, the manufacturing plants once shifted
abroad would not easily come back home. Because of this “hysteresis effect”, the fear of
de-industrialization once prevailed.
 The NIEs (Newly Industrialising Economies) and other ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) countries succeeded in industrialising their economies with
liberalised capital inflows. They established industrial export zones, associated with tax7
reductions, relaxing foreign ownership restrictions, thereby promoting inward foreign
investments. The open-door policy and market-oriented reforms of China since 1979
have also contributed to the growing intra-regional transactions. China has absorbed
the second largest amount of the FDI in the world, after the United States. By the early
1990s, Japan and Asian NIEs became the main investors in the region, where the
intra-regional FDI recorded 42% of the total stocks in 19927.
 The outward FDI from Japan rose from 1.4 trillion yen in 1985 to 7.35 trillion yen in
1990, with a subsequent decline to 1.5 trillion yen in 1993. The ratio to GDP stood at the
highest level of 1.7 % in 1990 . Whereas Asia occupied 24 % in overall FDI investments,
next to the US share of 42 % in 1994, Asian share recorded 38% in Japanese
manufacturing FDI, larger than the US share of 33%8.
  In East Asian foreign trade, the share of intra-regional trade grew from 38% in 1985 to
50% in 1997. This is based upon a triangular pattern of trade created by Japanese
multinationals. Electronics, automobile, and other machine manufacturers established
production bases for exports not only within Southeast Asia, but also back to Japan and
to North America. The Asian countries, on their part, increased imports of capital goods,
parts and intermediaries mainly from Japan to build factories and subsequently
assemble parts. In 1996, for example, Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries sold more
than 70% in East Asia (57% in the host countries, and 21% in Japan), while the export
to North America and other industrial countries remained rather quite small.9
 However, it is important to note that the share of the United States is far larger in
exports of all East Asian countries combined (Table 2) than the case of sales by
Japanese subsidiaries located in the region. This difference in market orientation can be
probably explained by the fact that parts and intermediates produced by Japanese
subsidiaries are sold to assemblers in the region, and their final goods are subsequently
exported to US markets, possibly with brand-names of the western manufactures10.
Moreover, the fact that the United States, at least from the mid-1980s, occupies a larger
share than Japan in East Asia’s overall exports, suggests that imports from Japan are
also closely related to final exports to the United States.
                                                  
7 Chia (2000). The share of intra-regional FDI is taken from her Table 5.
8 Those data are taken from BOJ, Economic Statistics Annual, and JETRO [Japan External
Trade Organization], White Paper of FDI, various issues.
9 MITI(1999), p. 131. According to Sato (1999) Table 12, 40% of intermediates are procured
from the local markets, and another 40% from Japan, as of 1995.
10 See also Sato (2000),Chapter 4.8
 Japanese imports from East Asia stagnated under the recession, with a share of ca.
35% of the total imports, while the East Asian share in Japanese exports declined from
a peak of more than 40% between 1995 and 1997 to less than 35% in 1998. Noteworthy
is the fact, however, that the intra-firm trade of Japanese multinationals largely
influences the manufacturing trade between East Asia and Japan. As of 1996, 25% of
Japanese exports and ca. 40% of imports are undertaken by Japanese subsidiaries11.
 The United States occupied constantly ca. 30% of Japanese exports, and 22-3% of
Japanese imports in the 1990s12. Thus, although East Asia as a whole occupies larger
share than the United States in both export and import sides of Japanese foreign trade,
the United States is the single largest trade partner for the country. In this way, the US
is situated in the key position of the East Asian triangular trade, which constitutes the
basis for the predominant role of the US dollar. In addition, the position of the dollar
has been rather strengthened during the last decade, because of the continued boom in
the United States, on the one hand, and the depression in Japan, on the other hand.
2. The Role of the Yen
2.1 The stance of Japanese side
The turning point for the internationalisation of the yen was marked by the report of
the US-Japan Yen/Dollar Committee of 1984. Japanese government reluctantly
accepted opening the domestic financial markets and relaxing regulations on the euro-
yen transactions. These measures would lead, as the US side expected, to the increased
share of the yen in the international transactions, thereby push the yen exchange rate
upwards. The monetary authorities in Japan initially stood firmly against the
international use of the yen, which, in their view, would undermine the effect of the
monetary policy. They gradually changed its stance, however, along with the recognition
that the control on money supply at home is of the primary importance for the stable
macro-economy.
 Indeed, the yen share in international financial markets did increase in the 1980s,
supported by financial liberalization and accelerated cross-border capital transactions.
The most peculiar fact on the part of Japanese financial institutions was a rapidly
growing investments in the United States, for example purchasing Federal Government
Bonds. In particular, life insurance companies increased foreign portfolio investments
                                                  
11 MITI(1999), pp. 130-1
12 MITI(1999), p.639
by 99.5 billion US dollars (converted with exchange rate at the end of 1990) between
1984 and 1990. Japanese investors, although the largest capital exporter of the world at
the time, were not able to invest abroad in their own currency, but in the US dollars. As
the yen rapidly appreciated after the Plaza Agreement, they largely suffered from
capital-loss due to investments in the US Government Bonds13. The large capital-loss of
the investors as well as the exchange risk for the foreign traders caused the public
opinion to recognize disadvantages of the limited use of the yen. After the Asian
currency crisis, Japanese government stepped forward to the internationalisation of the
currency, on which we shall discuss later in this Section.
2.2 The Limited Extent of Internationalisation
 As discussed above, the major part of Japanese capital abroad has been invested in US
dollars. Moreover, yen share in Japanese foreign trade has been traditionally smaller
than the proportion of national currencies in not only the US, but also German foreign
trade. In addition, yen denominated share in Japanese exports declined from 43% in
1993 to 36% in 1998, while the peak in the case of imports, 24% in 1995, was followed by
a slight decline to 22% in 1998. This is another example of the declining international
use during the 1990s. The yen share in exports is indeed higher in Asia than elsewhere,
but still less than 50%.14.
  The choice of the trade currency reflects at least two factors among others: composition
of goods and the trade partner. The limited share of yen in Japanese foreign trade has
been traditionally attributed to a large share of the United States in the export market
and raw materials and crude oil on the import side, both of which enhance the dollar
shares15. The latter part of this stylised explanation does not well fit to the recent
situation under which the manufactured imports has gained weight, and the yen share
has yet shrunk.
 In contrast to the real factors like foreign trade, convenience in the financial-and
foreign exchange markets has been stressed as a decisive factor for the global selection
of the currency. Invoicing in trade is naturally influenced by the convenience in trade
finance. The currency selection in trade is at most a secondary factor, as its remarkably
low proportion to the daily foreign exchange transactions suggests. In other words,
currency selection in financial transactions has gained more weight. Table 3, showing
                                                  
13 Iwami (1995), pp.107-12.
14 MITI (1999), p.206-7.
15 Ito (1994), pp.320-1.10
the relative position of the yen in the financial markets, reveals also a declining trend in
international bank-lending and bond-issues from the early 1990s.
  In this context, there has been a number of literature stressing that the further
liberalization of the Japanese financial market would be indispensable for the
internationally higher status of the yen. In particular, the short-term financial market
of the first quality, such as the FB (short-term government bill) market would help
foreign monetary authorities to employ their international reserves16. Although the
declining share of the yen in Table 3 is partly explained by the difficult situation of
Japanese firms, the more convenient opportunities in financial markets undoubtedly
enhance a preference for yen on the part of foreign investors. Financial reforms since
the 1980s have been introduced indeed in the similar direction, but there would surely
remain an insurmountable barrier for a currency like the yen to be internationally used.
  Iwami (1995, Ch.5) explained the global role of the dollar from the trade aspect,
although this explanation is unfortunately not yet widely accepted. We have to stress
the causality that foreign exchange markets have developed from the fact that most of
the countries had used the US dollar for their foreign trade. The depth of the market
(the large volume of transactions) is not necessarily a cause, but a result of a key
currency function. Once a currency gains a large amount of transactions, then, because
of the scale economy, the transaction cost will decline disproportionally to its demand.
Thereby, a virtuous circle between the larger trading volume and decreasing
transaction cost of that currency would appear. In the financial market as well, the
similar logic holds. Then comes out a crucial question of what was the initial cause that
generated a financial- and foreign exchange market based upon a particular currency
like the dollar. Here we have to come back to the historical background.
  In the postwar years when the international capital movements were restricted, it
was the foreign trade that determined a choice of the international currency. “Both
exports and imports from countries with a high share of trade are relatively successful
at imposing use of their own currencies. The larger a country’s trade, the more likely are
its currency, and probable movements in it, to be already familiar to trades. Such a
currency is also likely to offer a strong forward market, both familiarity and facility to
reduce risk encourage its use” stated Page (1981, p.62), explaining the dominant role of
the dollar in the world trade. The international financial business was largely
liberalized in the 1980s, after the world trade had developed on the basis of the dollar.
International financial markets were to develop on the basis of a currency already
                                                  
16 For example, MITI (1999), p. 203ff.11
widely used in foreign trade.
  Because the foreign exchange market had already developed on the basis of the dollar,
the growing turnover volume accelerated by the liberalized capital mobility
strengthened its vehicle currency function. It is rather a recent phenomenon that the
convenience in the financial transaction largely determines the selection of the
international currency. There has been so far no currency that initially gained a key-
position through financial convenience alone.
  
2.3    Larger Role in East Asia?
In East Asia as well, the US dollar is far more widely used than the yen although
the latter plays a larger role than in other regions. As far as the region’s official reserves
are concerned, the US dollar accounted for almost 60% of total reserves in the early
1990s17. Whereas the Asian data have not been published thereafter, the declining
share of yen in the world reserves suggests that its role would not have increased in this
region as well. Since official reserves are used for intervention in the foreign exchange
market, the large share of the US dollar is consistent with the fact that Asian countries
tried to keep their currencies stable in terms of the dollar18.
In denomination of foreign loans to East Asia and Pacific countries, yen share is
naturally larger than the case of all developing countries, because of Japanese ODA and
bank loans, for example those extended to Japanese subsidiaries in the region. Even in
this sphere, yen share shows a decrease from the peak of the early 1990s, while the US
dollars remarkably increased its share (Table 4). Japanese banks actually cut loans
abroad. Because the adequate capital ratio determined by the BIS (Bank for
International Settlements) include capital gains of the stocks held by banks, and as the
stock prices in Japan remarkably went down after the bubble-period, they cannot afford
to maintain the lending level so far extended.
Another interesting example is the currency selection of the Japanese
multinationals in this region. The yen-denominated share in their intra-firm trade
might be higher than in the overall trade of the host countries, but not remarkably high
as one might expect. As of 1992, 55% of Japanese multinationals’ exports to East Asian
subsidiaries was invoiced in yen, but 39% in US dollars, whereas their intra-firm
                                                  
17 Iwami (1995), Table 5.13.
18For the currency weight in the exchange-rate policy of Asian countries, see estimation by
Frankel and Wei (1994).12
imports was 45% in yen, and 46% in dollars19. As discussed above, Japanese
manufacturing subsidiaries sell their products largely in East Asia, where most of the
currencies used to be stabilized in terms of the dollar until the currency crisis in 1997.
Moreover, when the imported parts from Japan are assembled and finally exported to
the United States, trade in the US dollars is naturally convenient.
Since Japanese firms are said to rely on the marketing practice, called “pricing to the
market”, it is natural that their exports tend to be invoiced in dollars. When the yen
appreciates, the Japanese firms try to stabilise their export prices in dollars, thereby
maintaining the market shares at the cost of margins in yen. Although these
subsidiaries might as well import Japanese parts in yen, the export pricing of their
manufactured goods would not be so much different. In other words, whether to import
parts in dollars, or in yen leads to a difference in cost accounting, but it would not affect
price competitiveness as far as they keep the dollar–price unchanged. In this sense, the
currency situation of the export market is a decisive factor for the limited use of the yen.
An additional factor is, of course, that these subsidiaries raise and employ funds more
easily in the dollar financial market.
 The volatile yen/dollar exchange rate has affected business conditions in East Asian
countries in various ways. First, export price competitiveness, second, import price from
Japan, third, debt-service on yen loans, and fourth, FDI from Japan. Under the yen
appreciation, like in the 1990s, East Asian business enters booms through Japanese
FDI and growing exports to Japan, despite the increased cost of imported parts from
Japan. The yen depreciation tends to depress these economies in an opposite manner, as
Kwan (1998) stressed. This relationship naturally depends on the industrial structure
of Asian countries, in other words, whether or not their manufacturing industry has
arrived at the stage in competition with Japanese products. But the yen depreciation
after mid-1995, it was claimed, caused difficulties in these countries at the time of Asian
currency crisis of 1997 and 1998. Therefore, the currency crisis may have induced those
countries to reconsider pegging to the dollar, and to increase weight of other currencies,
like the yen, in their exchange-rate policy. Because their policy of pegging local
currencies to the dollar, it is argued, had a detrimental effect on the competitiveness of
their exports.
 However, yen has lost weight in long-term lending to the regional economy, and these
countries would not replace the dollar’s share with that of yen in their currency baskets,
because the conditions for these countries to depend on the dollar have not yet changed.
                                                  
19 Sato (1999), Table A1.13
Largely benefited from liberalised flows of goods and capital, at least until the currency
crisis, East Asian countries have developed a form of de facto economic integration.
According to Goto and Hamada (1994), the degree of economic interdependence is, in
some respects, higher among East Asian countries than among west Europeans. But
these countries are not inclined to form a closed block20. Most important for them is to
preserve good relations with major trade partners and capital suppliers, namely the
United States and Japan.
  Asian countries, including Japan, are so dependent on the United States, both
economically and politically, that intra-regional trade and capital transactions have
developed on the basis of the dollars. Financial integration is one aspect of this large
dependence on the United States.
    The last question is the future of Chinese currency, yuan. The ever-growing size of the
Chinese national economy will indeed enhance the relative position of the currency in
East Asia. But the yuan cannot replace yen in the region, much less the dollars, because
exchange controls and the closed system, in particular financial market in China
constitutes a major hindrance.
2.4  Economic  Diplomacy
    As for the Japan’s policy stance towards East Asian countries, we should take note of
the past liabilities, material as well as moral, during the War. Even today, Japan’s
regional policy is often compared with the old image of the Great East Asian Co-
prosperity Zone. Related to this factor, the rival position of China also prevents Japan
from taking a leading role in the region. Moreover, Japan’s economic difficulties have
recently hindered its initiative, not only in economic, but also in political terms.
 Another, far larger factor is the United States. The post-war history of Japanese
diplomacy has been focused almost entirely on relations with the United States, and
political initiatives independent from the latter have been quite rare. A good example is
the proposal of the EAEG (East Asian Economic Group) by the Malaysian Prime
Minister, Mahathir, in 1990. The initial plan was to build a framework of economic co-
operation, with Japan at the central position but excluding United States, Australia and
New Zealand. It did not come into existence, because the United States opposed a
grouping without its membership, and Japan did not welcome it, following the
American opposition.
                                                  
20 Frankel (1993) found no clear evidence of a bias towards the closed integration. This paper suggests,
however, the US anxiety about the Japan’s larger presence in East Asia, at the time of his writing.14
   At the early stage of the Asian currency crisis, the Japanese government proposed an
idea of the Asian Monetary Fund that was supposed to extend short-term credit to
countries facing currency attacks. It would work as a complementary miniature of the
IMF on the regional basis. After a while, however, Japan gave up this idea, mainly
because the United States rejected such a monetary scheme that would develop outside
its control. In stead, an agreement of regional currency co-operation, called Manila
Framework, was reached in November 1997. It includes regional surveillance, technical
assistance to strengthen financial sectors, as well as provisions of short-term financing
that should be consistent with the IMF adjustment program.
    These episodes show that international monetary policy constitutes only a part of the
whole diplomacy. The reason why Japan has been almost dependent on the US policy
can be attributed to two factors: firstly, the size of the US economy which determines
the scale of opportunities for Japanese exports (and investments therein), in other
words, anxiety that the US market might be closed, and secondly, the US military
capabilities which are indispensable for Japan’s security in East Asia, given the latter’s
constitutional constraints..
  It is true that Japan took financial measures, showing a sign of leaving away from the
passive stance. Until May 1998, Japan decided to provide 42 US billion dollars to Asian
countries in financial trouble. Moreover, Miyazawa Initiative was announced in
December 1998, thereby supplying 30 billion US dollars to assist Asian efforts to
recover from the crisis and to promote stability of the international financial market.
Nevertheless, these policies have not yet implied a clear direction of independence in
the international financial strategy.
 The capital flows to the United States and their business conditions largely influence
East Asia, including Japan. In this respect, the monetary policy of the BOJ has been, at
least partly, determined in view of the capital outflows to the US market. Since the low
interest rates prevent large scale Japanese savings from being profitably employed at
home, on the one hand, and the US stock exchange has experienced historically long
boom, on the other hand, there have been continued capital-outflows from Japan to the
United States. Thereby, a sort of anti-American feeling has grown at the grass-roots
level, that the domestic savings have been misused only to sustain financial gains of
American investors, and that Japanese economic difficulties have been caused, or to say
the least, worsened by the deregulation policies demanded from abroad.
 Nevertheless, if the American boom comes to a sudden end, East Asia is surely to
suffer from another recession. In this sense, there is a dilemma for Japanese monetary
authorities that cannot change their policy stance so far pursued. From the long-term15
viewpoint seen, however, it is desirable that they should find a standpoint towards the
more internationally independent policy.
3. Concluding Remarks
       Having reviewed Japan’s foreign economic relations during the last couple of decades,
we find that the volatile state of the yen/dollar exchange rate is the most influential
factor. It not only led to the economic frictions with the United States, but also
generated a new trade pattern with the East Asia. It has been one of the cores of the
Japan’s macroeconomic policy, that largely affected business cycles in this country as
well as in East Asia. Its stabilisation would accordingly reduce trade frictions and large
swings of the business cycles. In this respect, the proposal of McKinnon and Ohno
(1997) to fix the yen/dollar exchange rate seems to be quite appealing.
    However, the crucial point in their proposal is its feasibility. It is hard to imagine that
the United States would ever agree to fixing the exchange rate at the cost of its
independent macroeconomic policy-making, and even if it is agreed, standing against
the currency attack is not an easy task under the current regime of free capital
movements. We cannot agree with their views, either, that “the ever-higher yen
syndrome“ is simply resulted from the talk-up, or pressures of the US government (p.12.
for example). The long-term appreciation of the yen actually reflects fundamentals such
as increasing Japanese surplus on current account, in other words, the macro-economic
IS imbalance between the two countries, which McKinnon and Ohno also discuss in
other context.
             We have not yet       found a sufficient solution to accommodate exchange-rate
stabilization with the US predominant position in the world economy. Because of its
continued trade deficits, the situation is naturally more complicated. In Japan, due to
the current recession, such a feeling that the “globalization” means nothing but
Americanization has been strengthened. True that the US government, for its own sake,
has pressed other countries to open the market. But economic reforms so far commenced
are not necessarily all together disadvantageous to the national economies concerned.
Financial liberalization in Japan, for example, was natural outcome of changing fund
flows between the private and public sectors, on the one hand, and between private
non-financial and financial sectors, on the other hand. It is important to distinguish
good policies from the bad.
  While the monetary and economic integration like in Europe can be a protection
against the unstable state of the globalized economy, Japan has not been equipped with16
such a condition in East Asia. Although Japan once seemed to have paved a way for the
economic integration with neighbouring countries, the depression in the 1990s largely
obscured such a prospect. Economic recovery on a sounder basis will surely upgrade
Japan’s global presence again. Japan would not content with being only a passive
player.
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Table 1    International Reserves of the World    (ˋʣ
Year      1978   1980    1985    1990   1995    1998
US  $      72.9     52.9     49.8     43.4    51.4    56.3
DM       10.6     12.5     12.2     15.5    12.5    11.3
Yen        3.1      3.5       6.4     7.3     6.5     4.8
S D R        3 . 5       3 . 9        5 . 0       3 . 3      2 . 2      6 . 5
ECU       ---      15.7      10.3      8.5     7.0    0.7
Source: IMF, Annual Report, various issues.19
Table 2  Share of the United States and Japan in East Asian Foreign Trade (%)
Exports Imports
1980 1985 1991 1997 1980 1985 1991 1997
East Asia U.S.A 19.9 27 20.6 19.5 17.4 18.4 15.2 14.5
Japan 21.4 18 14 12 24 31 22.4 19.3
NIEs U.S.A 24.8 35 24.5 20.2 17.6 23.6 16.4 15.3
Japan 10.1 10.1 10.5 8.2 23.4 32 22.7 18.1
ASEAN U.S.A 16.4 19.8 18.6 18.9 15.4 15.2 14.5 15.2
Japan 29.6 26.1 18.3 13.6 21.9 20.9 24.2 20
Hong
Kong
U.S.A 26.1 30.8 22.7 21.8 11.8 9.5 7.6 7.8
Japan 4.6 4.2 5.4 6.1 23 23.1 16.4 13.7
Korea U.S.A 26.4 36.2 25.9 15.9 21.9 21.5 23.2 20.7
Japan 17.4 15.5 17.2 10.9 26.3 25.3 25.9 19.3
Taiwan U.S.A 34.1 48.1 29.3 24.2 23.7 23.6 22.5 20.3
Japan 11 11.3 12.1 9.6 27.1 27.6 30 25.4
Singapore U.S.A 12.5 21.2 19.7 18.5 14.1 15.2 15.8 16.9
Japan 8.1 9.4 8.7 7.1 18 17.1 21.3 17.6
Indonesia U.S.A 19.6 22.7 12 14.4 13 14.4 13.1 12.7
Japan 49.3 49.1 36.9 24.4 31.5 28.1 24.4 21.3
Malaysia U.S.A 16.4 12.8 16.9 18.6 15.1 15.3 15.3 16.6
Japan 22.8 24.6 15.9 12.5 22.8 23 26.1 21.7
Philippines U.S.A 27.5 35.9 35.6 34.4 23.5 25.1 20.2 16.9
Japan 26.6 19 20 16 19.9 14 19.4 19.7
Thailand U.S.A 12.7 19.6 21.1 19.4 14.5 11.2 10.5 13.8
Japan 15.1 13.3 17.8 15.2 21.2 26 29.1 25.7
Brunei U.S.A 8.6 0.1 1.1 2.2 20 7.4 13.7 5
Japan 70.9 67.1 62.6 53.9 23.7 13.3 15.8 4.2
Viet Nam U.S.A   ......  ......  ....... 4.3 0.1 3.6 0 2.2
Japan 28.4 19.6 32.8 22.7 14.1 26.6 6.4 9.9
China U.S.A 5.4 8.5 8.6 17.9 19.6 12.2 12.5 11.5
Japan 22.2 22.3 14.3 17.4 26.5 35.7 15.7 20.4
Source:  IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific
Countries.
Note:    East Asia = Hong Kong, Korea ,Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Brunei,
Viet Nam, China. NIEs = Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea. ASEAN = Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia,
Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, including Viet Nam in 1997.20
Table 3      Currency share in international financial markets
               
    Year      1977    1980   1984    1988    1991    1993    1995    1997
Eurodeposits
  U . S .   d o l l a r    7 2 . 6      7 0 . 9     7 6 . 9      6 1 . 4     5 2 . 7      5 0 . 7     4 8 . 5     4 9 . 8
  D M           1 5 . 9      1 4 . 1      8 . 9      1 2 . 2     1 4 . 7      1 6 . 7     1 7 . 3      n . a .
  Y e n            0 . 6       1 . 2       2 . 1       5 . 3      4 . 8       4 . 4      4 . 9      6 . 9
International bank-lending
   U . S .   d o l l a r    n . a .      8 9 . 3 *     7 1 . 7      6 4 . 2     8 4 . 5     8 1 . 0     7 6 . 8     6 9 . 8
   D M           n . a ,       1 . 8 *      2 . 2       2 . 8      2 . 1       3 . 2      4 . 1      3 . 3
   Yen          n.a.      1.1*    12.2      6.1     1.1      0.7     0.2     0.2
International bond-issues
   U . S .   d o l l a r    5 4 . 9      4 0 . 7      6 2 . 4      3 6 . 8     3 1 . 1     3 8 . 1      3 8 . 9     4 9 . 2
   D M           1 9 . 2      2 1 . 3       6 . 0      1 0 . 3      6 . 6     1 1 . 4      1 9 . 6      1 7 . 7
   Y e n            4 . 0       4 . 9       5 . 4       9 . 8      1 3 . 3    1 2 . 4      1 7 . 4       3 . 9
SourceɿOECD, Financial Market Trends, BIS, International Banking and Financial Market
Developments.
Note: * 198121
Table 4    Currency Share of Long-term Loans to Developing Countries (%)
East Asia and Pacific
         1970 1980 1991 1995 1997                         
DM   7.1   5.0   3.5   2.5   1.8
F.Franc   2.6   3.2   2.1   1.5   1.1
Yen               7.3   18.0   29.3   26.4   20.1
U.S. dollars     50.4  40.8  25.8  40.0  57.8
Others     32.6  33  39.3  29.6  19.2
All Developing Countries
          1970 1980 1991 1995 1997
DM   8.6   6.6   9.0   8.1   7.3
F.Franc   5.2   5.5   5.7   4.6   3.7
Yen   2.3   6.9   11.4   12.3   10.0
U.S.dollars  47.1  49.8  39.9  45.9  54.2
Others  36.8  31.2  34  29.1  24.8
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999.22
Figure 1    The Dollar exchange rate (quarterly average, 1970=100)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
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